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THE COMPLEX USES OF SEXUAL
ORIENTATION IN CRIMINAL COURT
ABBE SMITH

*

INTRODUCTION: CHANGING T IMES OR N OT
1

Times may or may not be changing for gay people in the criminal
justice system and for the import of sexual orientation in criminal
law. It depends on the nature of the case and, more importantly,
exactly whose sexual orientation we are talking about.
Signs of positive change include the recent high profile Matthew
2
3
Shepard and Diane Whipple cases, in which gay and lesbian
homicide victims were mourned not only by the gay community, but
4
also by the entire country. It was no doubt helpful that both
Shepard and Whipple presented very appealing images of gay people:
each was young, attractive, white and college educated  wholly
5
innocent victims.
*

Professor of Law and Associate Director, Criminal Justice Clinic and E. Barrett
Prettyman Fellowship Program, Georgetown University Law Center. With thanks to Sally
J. Greenberg for helpful suggestions, and Angela J. Davis and Michael Shortnacy for
inviting me to the symposium.
1. Not to unduly simplify an increasingly complex sexual landscape, but with
the intent of lessening the readers burden, the term  gay people here includes gay,
lesbian, bisexual, transgendered and transsexual people.
2. See Frank Rich, Summer of Matthew Shepard, N.Y. T IMES, July 3, 1999, at A11
(indicating that the murder of Matthew Shephard prompted a wave of positive
acceptance of homosexuality in popular and political culture).
3. See Anna Gorman, Mauling Death Creates an Activist Law: To Honor Her Late
Partner, Sharon Smith Presses Rights Issues for Gays and Lesbians, L.A. T IMES, Mar. 18,
2002, at B1 (noting the mauling death of Diane Whipple led her surviving partner to
press for the right for same-sex partners to sue in wrongful death actions).
4. Both cases received national press coverage. There have already been three
television movies about the Shepard case. See Michael Medved, TV Focuses on One
Hate Crime, Forgets Another, USA T ODAY, Jan. 31, 2001, at 15A (stating that violence
against gays has received increased television coverage).
5. Neither could be described as  flamboyantly gay. Neither was said to be
predatory or promiscuous. Although there was a suggestion that Shepard had made
a sexual advance on one of his assailants, this never seemed credible and was largely
kept from the jury. See Michael Janofsky, Judge Rejects Gay Panic As Defense in Murder
Case, N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 2, 1999, at A14 (noting that the concept of the  gay panic
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Notwithstanding the history of homophobia in the criminal
courts6 as a result of which gay, lesbian and transgendered
complainants have often not been regarded as victims at all, or were
discouraged from going forward because of their sexual
7
orientation  it was unsurprising that both the Shepard and Whipple
8
cases resulted in murder convictions.
It will be interesting to watch the upcoming prosecution of Darrell
D. Rice, who was recently charged with capital murder in the 1996
slaying of Julianne Williams and Laura Winans at a secluded campsite
defense does not exist in any states statutes). Both could be poster children for the
gay rights movement, along with Mark Bingham, who died a hero on September 11.
See Jon Barrett, This is Mark Bingham, ADVOCATE, Jan. 22, 2002, at 40 (recounting the
life of thirty-one-year-old former rugby player and Flight Ninety-Three passenger
Mark Bingham, whom the magazine selected as Person of the Year); Andrew
Sullivan, Right Turn: What Conservatives Should Learn From 9/11, N EW REPUBLIC, Dec.
17, 2001, at 22 (noting that openly gay Bingham has been widely seen as a September
11 hero). Meanwhile, the case of Billy Jack Gaither a thirty-nine-year-old workingclass gay man who was brutally killed in Alabama by a younger man who claimed
Gaither had propositioned him received relatively little national press. See
Accomplice Convicted in Killing, N.Y. T IMES, Aug. 6, 1999, at A15 (reporting that Charles
M. Butler was convicted of murder for Gaithers death). Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 88 (1999) (noting that poor
and nonwhite gays have always fared worse than middle-class white gays in the
criminal justice system).
6. See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 5, at 86-90 (discussing the historical lack of
procedural protections for gays in criminal court); N ATL L AW. GUILD, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE L AW 12.25-12.28 (Roberta Achtenberg ed., 2001) (suggesting a
connection between historical underreporting of violence against gays and
indifference and hostility by those who administer the law); see also Richard
Goldstein, Queer on Death Row: In Murder Cases, Being Gay can Seal a Defendants Fate,
VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 20, 2001, at 38 (arguing that a defendants homosexuality has
been a factor in several murder trials ending in a death sentence); David E. Rovella,
Criminal Cases; Poll Elicits Fear of Rogue Jury, N ATL L.J., Nov. 2, 1998, at A25 (reporting
that seventeen percent of jurors responding to a national survey admitted they would
not be fair if the case involved a homosexual).
7. Conventional wisdom had it that a gay complainant weakened the
governments case. See N ATL L AW. GUILD, supra note 6, at 12.26-12.31 (discussing
 secondary victimization of lesbians and gays in the criminal justice system);
RUTHANN ROBSON , L ESBIAN (OUT)L AW 151 (1992) (noting the anti-gay and lesbian
attitudes of court system personnel). As a public defender in Philadelphia in the
1980s, I saw prosecutors routinely reduce charges in serious cases often
encouraged by judges whenever a gay complainant had prior arrests for
solicitation. Since the spread of HIV/AIDS, the mere perception that a party is gay
may give rise to different treatment in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., N ATL
L AW. GUILD, supra note 6, at 12.27 (noting that some alleged victims of crime who
were perceived to be gay were made to undergo HIV tests).
8. See Michael Janofsky, Man is Convicted in Killing of Gay Student, N.Y. T IMES,
Nov. 4, 1999, at A14 (reporting that Aaron J. McKinney was found guilty of the
second-degree murder of Shepard); Evelyn Nieves, Couple Guilty of all Charges in Fatal
Attack by their Dog, N.Y. T IMES, Mar. 22, 2002, at A1 (reporting that the jury convicted
Marjorie Knoller and Robert Noel of all charges, including second-degree murder
for Knoller, for the dog mauling of Whipple). But see Gorman, supra note 3, at B1
(indicating that same-sex partners traditionally have no right to bring suit in a
wrongful death action).
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9

in Shenandoah National Park. Rice is alleged to have slashed the
throats of the two women who, like Shepard and Whipple, were
young, white, college educated and had loving and supportive
10
families because of their gender and sexual orientation. Attorney
General John Ashcroft, not generally known for his support of gay
rights, used the stature of the United States Attorneys Office to
personally announce Rices indictment for capital murder, noting
with favor the 1994 hate crimes law that will make it easier to
11
introduce evidence of alleged bias.
Still, these developments may ultimately have little impact on what
occurs in most criminal cases involving gay, lesbian or transgendered
people. The truth is most alleged victims of crime and most alleged
perpetrators do not look like Matthew Shepard, Diane Whipple,
Julianne Williams, Laura Winans or September 11 victim/hero Mark
12
Bingham. Moreover, enhanced sympathy for gay victims does not
necessarily translate into any sort of sympathy or identification with
the gay accused.
Probably the vast majority of openly gay or transgendered people
who wind up in criminal court are charged with solicitation or
13
Whether swept up by vice squads trying to keep
prostitution.
neighborhoods  clean, or caught in the act of soliciting an
undercover officer, these often  gender-bending defendants
14
comprise a large number of weekend arrests in most major cities.
They are notoriously badly treated throughout the criminal justice
system: police are nasty to them; marshals, court officers and other
court personnel often mock them; it is the rare judge or magistrate
9. See Christopher Marquis, Man is Charged in 2 Killings that U.S. Calls Hate Crime:
U.S. Uses 94 Law in Hikers Slayings, N.Y. T IMES, Apr. 11, 2002, at A27 (noting that
this is a high profile hate-motivated killing); Brooke A. Masters, Gay Bias Charged in
Deaths, WASH . POST, Apr. 11, 2002, at A1 (indicating that the murders were hate
crimes based on sexual orientation).
10. See Masters, supra note 9, at A1 (reporting that prosecutors quoted Rice as
saying he  hates gays and that the two women  deserved to die because they were
lesbian whores ).
11. See id. (describing that the evidence of bias will be Rices prior attack on a
female bicyclist in the same park).
12. See Accomplice Convicted in Killing, N.Y. T IMES, Aug. 6, 1999, at A15 (discussing
the conviction for the murder of Billy Jack, a working class gay man whose case
received little media attention).
13. See N AN D. H UNTER ET AL., T HE RIGHTS OF L ESBIANS AND GAY M EN 122-23 (3d
ed. 1992) (noting that gays are especially vulnerable to solicitation and loitering
statutes).
14. When I was a Philadelphia public defender assigned to weekend  midnight
to eight arraignments at the Police Administration Building, I often felt that the
cross-dressing prostitutes were much more convincingly feminine (and attractive)
than I was especially as the night wore on.
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They are
who treats these defendants with dignity or respect.
treated badly from a systemic viewpoint as well. For example, in the
District of Columbia there is a diversionary program for female
prostitutes, through which an accused can avoid prosecution, and a
diversionary program for male johns, but no such program for male
16
prostitutes.
The routine disrespect that gay, lesbian and transgendered
defendants experience is reflected in a recent case in the District of
Columbia Superior Court. The defendant, who was charged with
simple assault and possession of a prohibited weapon (a kitchen
knife), is biologically male but identifies as female. A piano teacher
with no prior criminal record, the defendant is slightly built, pretty
and has a good eye for clothing. She has considered herself female
since she was a teenager, and she appears in all respects looks,
affect and manner to be a woman. The incident arose out of an
altercation with the defendants boyfriend, who at that time was living
with her. When the defendant told the boyfriend she thought it best
for him to move out, the boyfriend went into a rage, destroying much
of the defendants living room and striking the defendants face.
When the police saw the condition of the defendant (who had visible
injuries) and her apartment (which was a wreck), and observed the
boyfriend smirking in the corner, they treated the defendant as the
victim she was. They were kind and even a little flirtatious. When,
upon asking for identification, they discovered the defendants
gender, things changed dramatically. Suddenly, the police became
hostile and abusive. They arrested the defendant based on her
acknowledgment that she picked up a knife to defend herself during
the attack, and the boyfriends claim that he was the victim. Although
the case was ultimately dismissed for  want of prosecution after the
boyfriend failed to appear, it was a painful experience for the
defendant, who will likely refrain from summoning the police for
assistance in the future.17
15. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 5, at 88 (noting that drag queens, butch lesbians, and
cross-dressers outside the middle class are historically the  most despised people in
criminal court); see also Civil Rights for the Transgendered, N.Y. T IMES, May 1, 2002, at
A24 (explaining that transgendered people,  some of societys most vulnerable
citizens, are not only discriminated against by the court system, but also
discriminated against in employment, housing, restaurants, stores, and are frequently
the victims of hate crimes).
16. The lack of a diversionary program for gay people is a matter of practice, not
law.
17. The case was handled by a post-graduate fellow in the E. Barrett Prettyman
Fellowship Program at the Georgetown University Law Center, which I supervised. I have
received the clients permission and  blessing to write about her case.
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18

This is not an unusual story. Sexual orientation still matters in
day-to-day criminal cases,19 with most of those involved in criminal law
enforcement and administration not terribly enlightened about
gender identity or sexual orientation. Most lawyers are probably not
much better. Still, it would be far too easy to say that the  use and
abuse of sexual orientation in criminal law is rooted in ignorance or
bigotry. The context in which the issue arises the adversarial
system makes the whole matter more complex.
II. T HE COMPLEX USES OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AT T RIAL
The use of sexual orientation in a criminal case most often raises
tactical and strategic questions, rather than ethical or doctrinal ones.
20
Take, for example, the 1986 trial of Patsy Kelly Jarrett. Jarrett was a
North Carolina woman with no prior record who denied any
knowledge of or involvement in a robbery and murder in upstate
New York. A court-appointed lawyer who represented her decided it
would be better to let the jury assume that she was the girlfriend of
her male traveling companion (against whom there was substantial
21
evidence) rather than have them know she was a lesbian. Despite
the scant and troubling one-witness identification evidence by a
retired factory worker (who, two days after the crime, could not state
for certain the gender of the person he observed in a car, and could
22
not describe any facial features), and Jarretts strong claim of
innocence, she was convicted of all charges and has now served
twenty-five years of a life sentence at Bedford Hills Prison.
The trial lawyers decision to hide or at least not disclose
Jarretts sexual orientation was not motivated by the lawyers own
bigotry or malice, but by a genuine concern (however misguided it
seems now) that jurors might hold Jarretts homosexuality against
18. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 5, at 88 (noting that cross-dressers are arrested,
beaten, and harassed by the police more often than other gay people).
19. See Amelia Craig Cramer & Amy Todd, Sexual Orientation Bias in Arizonas
Legal System, ARIZ. ATTY., Oct. 2000, at 37.
20. See Jarrett v. Headley, 802 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that pre-trial
identification procedures were unduly suggestive). I now represent Jarrett and have
written about her case before. See Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN . L.
REV. 485, 495-97 (2000) [hereinafter Smith, Defending the Innocent] (detailing my
repeated attempts to free Jarrett); see also Karen Avenoso, The Defense Never Rests,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 1997, (Magazine), at 14 (recounting my initial
representation of Jarrett first as a New York University law student, and then as a
lawyer).
21. See Jarrett, 802 F.2d at 36 (describing Jarretts relationship with her male
companion as her  paramour ).
22. See Jarrett v. Headley, 633 F. Supp. 1403, 1403 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (suggesting
that Jarrett may well be an innocent victim of a mistaken identification).
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her. In Jarretts lawyers view and Jarrett followed his advice the
23
jury would be more fair if they believed she was heterosexual.
24
Now, when Jarretts only remedy is executive clemency, her sexual
orientation continues to pose strategic challenges. Although she still
identifies as gay, Jarrett has become a devout Catholic and is celibate.
Though she was formerly an open and proud lesbian, her sense of
self now comes more from faith than from sexual orientation. More
importantly, there is no source of public support for a wrongly
convicted and imprisoned lesbian. There is plenty of support for gay
25
victims, especially gay victims of violence. But there is nothing for a
lesbian or gay man accused or convicted of violence. Jarretts lack of
support in the gay community which is partly the result of the gay
communitys lack of awareness about her case, as it is neither a capital
case nor one that received any national press resembles lesbian
death row inmate Wanda Jean Allens difficulty garnering support.26
Being a convicted murderer seems to eclipse ones membership in
the gay community.
The use of sexual orientation at trial becomes more complex when
27
it appears to perpetuate or exploit homophobia. For example, in
23. See Jarrett, 802 F.2d at 39 (referring to the homosexual experiences of Jarretts
travelling companion, but making no mention her being a lesbian).
24. See Smith, Defending the Innocent, supra note 20, at 504-07 (discussing the
difficulties of obtaining clemency for Jarrett).
25. See generally GREGORY M. H EREK & KEVIN T. BERRIL, H ATE CRIMES:
CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST L ESBIANS AND GAY M EN (1992); GARY DAVID
COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST L ESBIANS AND GAY M EN 24 (1992) (discussing a violent
anti-gay incident in 1972 that led to more public support for gay and lesbian victims
of violence); CLAUDIA BRENNER, EIGHT BULLETS: ONE WOMAN S STORY OF SURVIVING
ANTI-GAY VIOLENCE 149-51 (1995) (detailing the response of the community and gay
and lesbian activists to an anti-lesbian murder).
26. See Michael B. Shortnacy, Guilty and Gay, A Recipe for Execution in American
Courtrooms: Sexual Orientation as a Tool for Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases,
51 AM . U. L. REV. 309, 341-44 (2001) (noting the issue made of Allens sexual
orientation during trial); see also Allen v. Massie, 202 F.3d 281 (10th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1032 (2000) (denying defendants petition for a rehearing); Allen v.
State, 871 P.2d 79 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 952 (1994)
(reaffirming Allens death sentence). Allens post-conviction lawyer has noted the
difficulties experienced organizing support for Allens clemency petition from the
gay and lesbian community in Oklahoma. See also Steven Presson, Remarks at the
Symposium, Homophobia in the Halls of Justice: Sexual Orientation Bias and its Implications
Within the Legal System at the American University Washington College of Law (Mar. 26,
2002) (transcript on file with the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy &
the Law) (chronicling the difficulties faced by homosexual defendants in the courts).
27. See Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discovering the
Road Less Traveled, 96 COLUM . L. REV. 788, 789-93 (1996) (discussing the criminal
lawyers duty to advocate on behalf of clients even if it means exploiting race); Eva S.
Nilsen, The Criminal Defense Lawyers Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8 GEO. J. L EGAL
ETHICS 1, 17-27 (1994) (examining the ethics of exploiting race in advocacy); Abbe
Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do
Terrible Things, 28 H OFSTRA L. REV. 925, 948-57 (2000) [hereinafter Smith, Defending
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the highly publicized trial in which New York police officers were
alleged to have physically and sexually assaulted Haitian immigrant
28
Abner Louima, the defense theory came under sharp attack. The
problem was that in defense counsel Marvyn Kornbergs opening
statement on behalf of Officer Justin Volpe, who pled guilty mid29
trial, he suggested that Louimas internal injuries were the result not
30
of police brutality but of consensual same-sex sex.
There was outcry about this defense from both the left and the
right. Progressive commentators and gay rights advocates questioned
the ethics of using a theory that perpetuated a stereotype that gays
31
Others decried the idea that
engage in rough or violent sex.
Louima was gay or had engaged in gay sex as character assassination,
32
insulting and  slanderous. Reverend Al Sharpton went so far as to
Defending] (discussing the exploitation of race, sex, sexual orientation, and ethnicity
in criminal defense).
28. See generally Smith, Defending Defending, supra note 27, at 925. Louima accused
Officer Volpe of shoving a broom handle into Louimas rectum in a Brooklyn
precinct bathroom in 1997, causing massive internal injuries including a torn colon,
lacerated bladder, and ruptured intestine. Id.; see also Mike McAlary, The Last Cop
Story, ESQUIRE, Dec. 1997, at 118, 124 (detailing the horrific details of Louimas
beating).
29. See McAlary, supra note 28, at 154 (reporting that Volpe asserted his
innocence when charges were filed). He pled not guilty and publicly maintained
innocence until his change of plea in the middle of trial on May 25, 1999. See David
Barstow, Hoping to Escape Life Term, Officer Admits Mans Torture, N.Y. T IMES, May 26,
1999, at A1 [hereinafter Barstow, Officer Admits Mans Torture] (reporting that Officer
Volpe pled guilty to violently sodomizing Abner Louima); see also Tom Morganthau
et al., A Police-Brutality Case Ends with a Guilty Plea, N EWSWEEK, June 7, 1999, at 42
(indicating that the police officer never changed his story and then pled guilty midtrial).
30. Kornberg said in the opening:  You will hear from a forensic pathologist
and you will hear from other medical doctors that the injuries sustained by Mr.
Louima are not, I repeat not, consistent with a nonconsensual insertion of an object
into his rectum . . . . David Barstow, Officer, Seeking some Mercy, Admits to Louimas
Torture, N.Y. T IMES, May 26, 1999, at A1.
31. See Jesse Green, Gays and Monsters: The Way we Live Now, N.Y. T IMES, June 13,
1999, (Magazine), at 13 (arguing that the defense theory that Louima had engaged
in consensual anal sex earlier on the night of the incident played into the vilification
of gays in public discourse); Laura Mansnerus, When the Job Requires a Walk on the
Ethical Line, N.Y. T IMES, May 30, 1999, at D10 (quoting University of Pennsylvania law
professor David Rudovsky, who called the defense  crazy ); see also Gay Group Faults
Defense, N.Y. T IMES, May 7, 1999, at B6 (reporting that a group of gay rights advocates
criticized Kornberg for suggesting that Louimas injuries were the result of
consensual same-sex sex).
32. Reverend Al Sharpton threatened to file a complaint with the disciplinary
agency that oversees lawyers, accusing Kornberg of  slandering Louima, who is
married and has two children. See David Barstow, Brash Defense Lawyer Shrugs Off
Attacks, N.Y. T IMES, June 13, 1999, at A47 [hereinafter Barstow, Brash Defense Lawyer].
It is interesting that much of the outrage generated by the suggestion that Louima
was injured during consensual homosexual sex was because Louima is not gay. This
is an overreaction, at the very least. The idea that being called gay is at all
comparable to being held down on a police precinct bathroom floor while being
brutalized with a broom handle is both ludicrous and homophobic. It demeans the
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call it a  second rape.
One commentator suggested that the  outrage over the supposed
34
slight shows that Kornberg was onto something larger than the
refutation of medical evidence at trial. This commentator argued
that, holding aside the implausibility of the defense,  it played
cleverly on the expectation that a jury of ordinary Americans would
still see homosexuality as vile, and see violence as normal in a
homosexual act at least in preference to seeing sadism as normal in a
35
heterosexual arrest. How else explain a torn rectum and bladder?
Still, the question of how else to explain a torn rectum and bladder
remains within the province of adversarial advocacy. When an
accused maintains innocence and insists on going to trial, as Volpe
initially did, what else can a criminal defender do but fashion an
appropriate defense? There is nothing unethical about using racial,
36
gender, ethnic or sexual stereotypes in criminal defense. It is simply

brutality Louima endured and it demeans gay people. Moreover, there is something
naive about the insistence that Louima could not have had consensual anal sex
because he is married and has two children. He would not have been the first married
man to engage in extramarital sex, whether with a woman or a man. See, e.g., Six Feet
Under: Back to the Garden (HBO television broadcast, Apr. 14, 2002) (portraying the
discovery of a married man having sex with another man). Moreover, anal sex is not
the sole province of male homosexual sex.
33. Mansnerus, supra note 31. Sharpton seemed to take particular offense on
Louimas behalf, calling the intimation of homosexuality  beyond the realm of any
decency. See also Barstow, Brash Defense Lawyer, supra note32 (noting that Al
Sharpton filed a complaint against the defense lawyer calling the use of homosexual
sex theory a  bogus claim).
34. Green, supra note 31.
35. Id. (emphasis added). In a thoughtful commentary about the continued
vilification of gays in public discourse notwithstanding a veneer of increased
tolerance, Jesse Green notes a number of recent cases in which  lawyers and
hucksters have  created around gayness a nimbus of culpability. Id. He argues
that Kornberg did the same with Louima:
If it could be suggested that Louima were gay (though he was at the club that
evening indulging in archetypal straight behavior: flirting with other women
while the wife stayed home), he might be deserving of the treatment he got,
whoever may have done it, in love or fury.
The tactic failed, but not because it was despicable or even because it was a
lie; what defeated Volpe was the testimony of other cops. Still, Kornbergs
easy recourse to assumptions about the violence and depravity of gayness
accompanied by a Seinfeldian not-that-theres-anything-wrong-with-that shrug
proved that homosexuality is still Americas favorite goblin.
Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
36. I have previously argued, for example, that the ethical requirement of
zealous advocacy trumps the  new ethic of color- and gender-blind jury selection.
See Abbe Smith, Nice Work If You Can Get It: Ethical Jury Selection in Criminal Defense,
67 F ORDHAM L. REV. 523, 540 (1998) (noting that the law does not reflect a  colorblind society and is thus susceptible to the use of racial and gender stereotyping in
criminal defenses).
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37

an aspect of zealous advocacy. Prejudice exists in the community
and in the courthouse, and effective criminal defense lawyers
38
recognize this as a fact of life. Of course, most bias and prejudice
works against the criminal accused, disproportionate numbers of
39
whom are poor and nonwhite.
Questions could certainly be raised and many commentators
raised them at the time40 about the soundness of the strategy of
suggesting same-sex sex as the source of Louimas injuries. The scant
evidentiary support for the theory, Louimas essential credibility, and
the sophistication of the New York jury pool which would recognize
a red herring, and a homophobic one at that all weighed against
this defense. This is no doubt why Volpe eventually pled guilty.41
37. Lord Brougham provided the classic statement of the ideal of zealous
advocacy:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them
to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon
others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go
on reckless of consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve
his country in confusion.
2 T RIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (London, Shackell & Arrowsmith 1820-21).
The first codification of the requirement of zeal in this country was in 1908. See ANN .
M ODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT 41-52 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the history of Rule
1.3 and whether it requires zealous advocacy); see also M ODEL CODE OF PROFL
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1996) ( A lawyer shall represent his client zealously within
the bounds of law. ). But see M ODEL CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10 (1996)
( The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not militate against his
concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal
process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm. ); M ODEL RULES OF PROFL
CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (1996) ( A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication
to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the clients behalf.
However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized by
a client. A lawyer has professional discretion in determining the means by which a
matter should be pursued. ).
For discussions of zealous advocacy with an emphasis on criminal defense, see
M ONROE H. F REEDMAN , UNDERSTANDING L AWYERS ETHICS 65-86 (1990); DAVID L UBAN ,
L AWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 11-12 (1988); Barbara Allen Babcock,
Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 184 (1983-84); Charles P. Curtis, The
Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN . L. REV. 3 (1951).
38. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Balancing Victims Rights and Vigorous Advocacy for the
Defendant, 1989 ANN . SURV. AM . L. 135, 152 ( A courtroom is a laboratory of life . . .
[and] each lawyers wish to win may lead him or her to exploit prevailing cultural
biases. ).
39. See generally DAVID COLE, N O EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5, 169-78 (1999) (arguing that race and class bias operates
in every aspect of the criminal justice system).
40. See, e.g., Mansnerus, supra note 31 (quoting prominent defense lawyer David
Rudovsky who called the defense theory  crazy ).
41. See generally Morganthau, supra note 29, at 42 ( Volpe last week stunned the
city by changing his plea to guilty. ).
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A more mundane example of the exploitation of bias relating to
sexual orientation in advocacy or, at the very least, of insensitivity to
those with a nontraditional sexual identity occurred in a recent
case handled by the Georgetown Criminal Justice Clinic. In the case,
the Clinic represented a male client who was alleged to have
assaulted a transgendered person someone who was biologically
male but identified as female.
Notwithstanding the female
identification of the complaining witness, in cross-examination
defense counsel pointed out that the witness was biologically male,
and consistently referred to the witness as  sir instead of  maam.
Though this may have been unseemly, it was an entirely appropriate
defense strategy.
In a similar vein, the first felony case I ever tried (making it forever
memorable) involved a woman accused of stabbing her former
female lover. Although the prosecution contended that my client
attacked the complainant for poking fun of the defendants clothes
 in particular her  yellow pants 42 the defense was a version of
43
battered womens self-defense. The defendant, who had no prior
criminal record, claimed that she grabbed a knife to protect herself
from the complainant, whose reaction to the demise of the
relationship included harassment, stalking and repeated threats. In
the course of the trial, I did not refrain from pointing out the
complainants larger and more muscular build, lack of children (my
client had two) and tougher (no doubt read as  masculine )
demeanor generally. Although I was clearly playing into a  butch
stereotype a stereotype that had little to do with the central matter
of credibility, but did support the defendants  reasonable fear of
her larger, fiercer assailant this seemed an appropriate part of the
trial strategy. The defendant was found not guilty.

42. I was a relative newcomer to Philadelphia when I handled this case for the
public defenders office. When I first read the police reports and saw that my client
was alleged to have stabbed the complainant after the complainant called her,
 Yellow pants, yellow pants, I was hopeful that perhaps  yellow pants was a
particularly offensive epithet in the City of Brotherly Love along the lines of a
racial epithet or an insult to your mother goading even the most peaceful to lose
control, or better, to reasonably fear attack. I was disappointed when it turned out
that my client was simply wearing yellow pants.
43. See generally ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 75-87 (1987)
(outlining the psychological condition that keeps women in abusive relationships
and leads to violent acts); ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND F EMINIST L AW
M AKING (2000) (exploring the legal implications of the battered woman defense);
Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current
Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991) (dismantling the theory that current
criminal law doctrine cannot incorporate self defense claims of battered women who
kill abusive men).
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III. A QUESTION OF LAW, NOT ETHICS
In 1988, Claudia Brenner, the surviving victim of a would-be
double homicide on the Appalachian Trail, asked me to represent
her.44 On May 13 of that year, a  mountain man 45 named Stephen
Roy Carr secretly followed Brenner and her lover Rebecca Wight as
they were hiking and camping in Central Pennsylvania. After setting
up camp, Brenner and Wight, believing themselves alone in a
secluded spot, made love. Carr watched the two women have sex and
afterward repeatedly fired his rifle at them, hitting Brenner and
46
47
killing Wight. Wight literally died in Brenners arms.
During pretrial hearings, the defendant made clear that he would
48
raise a variation of  homosexual panic as his defense. In response
to a prosecution motion in limine which sought to prevent Carr from
raising this defense at trial, which I drafted, Carr spelled out his
defense more fully. He argued that seeing two women have sex
 provoked him into shooting them, and that his psychosocial history
(being abused and neglected as a child, being sexually assaulted by a
man in prison, being routinely rejected by women and suspecting
that his mother was a lesbian) was relevant to his defense of

44. See BRENNER, supra note 25 (detailing the story of female victim of a violent
hate crime). The case is reported in Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990). See generally Abbe Smith, On Representing a Victim of Crime, in L AW
STORIES 155, 157-58 (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996) [hereinafter Smith,
On Representing a Victim of Crime] (noting my hesitation to be a private counsel to a
victim in litigation where the cards are already stacked against the criminal
defendant).
45. See Abbe Smith, On Representing a Victim of Crime, supra note 44, at 157-58
(explaining the events leading to Claudia Brenners attack).
46. See BRENNER, supra note 25.
47. See id.
48. See N ATL L AW. GUILD, supra note 6, at 12.29 (explaining that the premise of
this defense is that it is reasonable for a person generally a man to  panic when
confronted by homosexuality, and to react violently in order to protect ones
heterosexuality). See generally Christina Pei-Lin Chen, Provocations Privileged Desire:
The Provocation Doctrine, Homosexual Panic, and the Non-Violent Unwanted Sexual
Advance Defense, 10 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POLY 195, 199-203 (2000) (analyzing the
genesis and development of the homosexual panic defense); Gary David Comstock,
Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, 2 L AW & SEXUALITY 81 (1992); Robert B.
Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient
Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 159-61 (1992) (describing the weaknesses of the
homosexual panic defense); see also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two
Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM . L. REV. 269, 272 (1996) (discussing
of the role of  emotion in criminal law and using the Carr case as an example). Cf.
Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 M ICH . L. REV. 1621, 1637
(1998) (referring to  the threat that open deviance poses to the status of those who
faithfully abide by dominant norms and noting that  [m]erely rebuffing the odd
homosexual advance isnt enough to protect the homophobe from that sort of
threat. ).
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49

provocation.
Commonwealth v. Carr had nothing to do with the defense lawyers
duty to mount a defense, however offensive the particular defense
50
might be. The defense lawyers ethics were not at issue in the case.
Instead, the case raised questions relating to the criminal law
doctrine of provocation and the law of evidence. The criminal law
question was whether merely observing a same-sex couple engage in
sexual activity could cause a reasonable person to kill in a heat of
passion, reducing murder to manslaughter. The evidentiary question
was what evidence might an accused introduce at trial to establish
that he might be likelier to react violently to witnessing same-sex sex.
The trial judge granted the prosecution motion to preclude what
51
As a result, the
may have been the defendants only defense.
defendant pled guilty to murder for a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole, with the qualification that he be allowed to
appeal the trial courts ruling on the motion in limine.
The trial judge was eloquent in his written ruling:
[The women] sought the solitudes of a location thought pristine.
Many may frown upon what they did, but they broke no law and
only pursued activities in which they had a right to engage.
Defendant, on the other hand, brought an attitude and disposition
that would be considered evil in any civilized circumstance.
People seem to live constantly in eras when one group or another
feels justified in ending human life for reasons thought to be
sufficient. History is replete with examples of utmost cruelty being
inflicted on those termed heretic, witches, sodomites, and the
like. . . .
The victims . . . did not harm Defendant . . . . His murderous act
52
cannot be mitigated by such trivial provocation.
53

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court.

49. See Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1363-64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(holding that the appellants  history of misfortunes did not justify the acts for
which he was accused).
50. See, e.g., ANN . M ODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT 41-52 (2d ed. 1992)
(providing that it is a lawyers professional obligation to zealously defend the accused
in all cases including capital murder).
51. See Smith, On Representing a Victim of a Crime, supra note 44, at 162-63
(acknowledging ambivalence about government motions in limine that preclude a
defendant from putting on a defense even though the defense has no basis in law).
52. Commonwealth v. Carr, no.CC-385-88, Court of Common Pleas, Adams
County, Pennsylvania, Opinion on Post-Verdict Motions, Oscar F. Spicer, President
Judge, at 13, 16 (quoted in Smith, On Representing a Victim of a Crime, supra note 44, at
166).
53. See Carr, 580 A.2d at 1364.
The sight of naked women engaged in lesbian love-making is not adequate
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CONCLUSION : T HE VILLAINY AND VIRTUE OF ADVOCACY
It is always nice to be on the right side. No doubt I was at my most
popular (at least in some circles) when I represented a heroic victim
of anti-gay violence Claudia Brenner in the Carr case.
Notwithstanding my own misgivings about the victims rights
movement54 and the discomfort I experienced as a lifelong criminal
55
defense lawyer representing a victim for the first time, I felt good
about my role in that case, and about the result. I believed in my
client and in her cause which was not to send Stephen Roy Carr to
56
the death chamber, but to make sure that the law fully recognized
the seriousness of Carrs crime and held him accountable.
Likewise, it was gratifying to represent a transgendered client who
was mistreated by the police and wrongly accused of assault once they
discovered the clients  true gender. Representing this client was
entirely consistent with much of what motivates me to be a criminal
defender: I was defending a marginalized member of a social
minority (who also happened to be poor and black) who was a victim
of ill treatment at the hands of the police.
Still, this is what defenders do in most cases, whether they are
fighting against or exploiting prejudice and bigotry on behalf of an
accused. By and large, the criminally accused are impoverished and
57
As
marginalized members of a social, ethnic or racial minority.
provocation to reduce an unlawful killing from murder to voluntary
manslaughter. It is not an event which is sufficient to cause a reasonable
person to become so impassioned as to be incapable of cool reflection A
reasonable person would simply have discontinued his observation and left
the scene; he would not kill the lovers . . . . [The law] does not recognize
homosexual activity between two persons as legal provocation sufficient to
reduce an unlawful killing of one or both of the actors by a third person
from murder to voluntary manslaughter.

Id.
The appellate court also dismissed the suggestion that the accuseds psychosocial
history had any bearing on the doctrine of provocation holding that the  appellants
history of misfortunes are not events which are in any way related to the events which
he claims establish a foundation for a manslaughter verdict. Id. at 1365.
54. See generally Yaroshefsky, supra note 38, at 141-45 (analyzing the conflict
between protecting the victim and protecting the constitutional rights of the accused
to defend themselves).
55. See generally Smith, On Representing a Victim of a Crime, supra note 44, at 152-54,
160-64.
56. See BRENNER, supra note 25, at 116, 169-73 (explaining that Brenner never
sought the death penalty for Carr).
57. See generally JEFFREY REIMAN , . . . AND THE POOR GET PRISON : ECONOMIC BIAS IN
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 92-94 (1996) (establishing that the American criminal
justice system focuses primarily on individuals who are members of minority groups
or who are impoverished); see also CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY:
RACE, POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 143-203 (1992) (discussing the  underclass
and explaining that nonwhites are far more likely than whites to be members of the
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social mores change, and gays cease to be regarded as either
58
bogeymen or narrow, one-dimensional caricatures, the strategy of
exploiting bias and prejudice will likely become less and less effective.
In other words, as our society becomes more enlightened and
accepting, so will criminal practice. There are some who believe that
lawyers and especially criminal trial lawyers, who are sometimes in
the public light ought to lead the way to this new day.59 I do not
think so. I think we ask enough already of those who defend the least
60
popular and least powerful among us.
Criminal trial advocacy is a tricky business. The criminal lawyer
shoulders the enormous burden of safeguarding another human
beings life and liberty. The criminal lawyer routinely stands between
61
his or her client and the purgatory we call criminal punishment.
62
This is an honorable vocation and one that is essential to our
63
adversarial system of justice.
underclass and almost always live in racially segregated neighborhoods).
58. See Bruce Bawer, More Respect, but too Few Rights, N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 26, 2001, at
A19(reporting that a Los Angeles Times survey conducted in June, 2000, found that
seventy-four percent of respondents said they were comfortable around
homosexuals, sixty-eight percent supported equal rights for gays in the workplace,
and more than half said gay couples should have the same rights and benefits as
straight couples); cf. Elizabeth Becker, Wariness and Optimism Vie as Gays View New
President, N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 26, 2001, at A1 (reporting that the Republican party is
becoming more hospitable to gays, but also noting that John Ashcroft, whom
President George W. Bush had just nominated for Attorney General, has said he
believes homosexuality is a sin).
59. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89 Geo. L.J. 2227,
2229(2001) (discussing the criminal defense attorneys discretion and responsibility
in racial storytelling); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 T EX. L. REV. 1293, 1349
(1998) (contending that reforming the conduct of judges and attorneys requires the
abandonment of the color blind canon of race neutrality); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95 M ICH . L. REV. 1063, 1074
(1997) (noting that the model code and the model rules recognize the need to use
racial narratives in criminal defense theories); Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial
Violence, 95 COLUM . L. REV. 1301, 1306 (1995) (concluding that defense attorneys
have a race-conscious responsibility to avoid constructs that construe racial identity in
terms of deviance).
60. See Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us: Race-Conscious Ethics in Criminal
Defense, 77 T EX. L. REV. 1585, 1589 (1999) (criticizing Anthony Alfieris work on race
as wrongly focused on defense lawyers and hostile to advocacy on behalf of the
accused).
61. See generally SCOTT CHRISTIANSON , WITH L IBERTY F OR SOME: 500 YEARS OF
IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA (1998); T ED CONOVER, N EWJACK (2000); WILBERT RIDEAU &
RON WIKBERG, L IFE SENTENCES: RAGE AND SURVIVAL BEHIND BARS (1992); SOL
WACHTLER, AFTER THE M ADNESS: A JUDGES OWN PRISON M EMOIR (1997) (describing
the horrors of prison life).
62. See generally Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense,
50 M ERCER L. REV. 443, 462 n.117 (1999) (comparing the Biblical figure of Esther to
the modern defense attorney). Both are lone defenders who take personal risks to
stand up to a more powerful figure on behalf of someone else. Id.
63. See Smith, Defending the Innocent, supra note 20, at 511 (contending that when
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The chief tool of the defender is persuasion. Effective strategies of
persuasion always involve playing on the sympathies and prejudices of
an audience at least to some degree.64 This is how you move a
judge or jury how you get them to identify with the position youre
advancing, or at least identify less with your opponents position.
As the place of gay people in society and in criminal court changes
and evolves, we should be mindful of the fact that adversarial
advocacy has been both a boon and a burden to gays. The recent
good press for gay victims like Matthew Shepard and Diane Whipple
is a promising development. Perhaps times are truly changing. Still,
gay peoples experience in the criminal system particularly gay
defendants is too often unpredictable, unsettling, and unpleasant.
Those concerned about the treatment of gays in criminal court must
recognize that there are no easy answers, but one comforting bedrock
principle: gay people accused of crime are entitled to the same
zealous, devoted, and hard-fought advocacy as everyone else.

one undertakes the representation of criminal defendants, he or she should avoid
the issue of innocence because the truth  even when it supports innocence is often
complicated and murky and may not make a very good story. ).
64. See generally CLARENCE DARROW, T HE STORY OF M Y L IFE (1934) (contending
that it is impossible for people to set aside their opinions without direct
contradicting evidence); M ICHAEL T IGAR, EXAMINING WITNESSES 5 (1993) (observing
that a lawsuit is a  contest between two different stories. ).
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